Příklad recenze 2
James Headley, Russia and the Balkans. Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin, published by HURST Publishers Ltd, London 2008, 552 pages.
James Headley, a lecturer in political studies at the University of Otago, New Zealand, wrote in many respects original study (monograph) because this important and topical theme was until now neglected by scholars. The events in former Yugoslavia were according to Headley from many reasons “the subject of intense debate within Russia”. First of all the conflict in Yugoslavia served as a “horror mirror”, as a deterrent example how the dissolution of the Soviet Union should not be directed. Yet the author argues that on the other side within the Soviet Union were influential people (nationalists) who “admired the Serbian leadership and the Bosnian and Krajina Serb leaders for seeking to maintain a state for Serbs, a Greater Serbia” and were inspired by centralists in Belgrade who maintained a unitary state. In this sense, as Headley documents, the Yugoslavian conflict became also the matter of struggle among the various political streams in Russia. Significantly the war in Yugoslavia helped the Russian politics after the end of the Cold war to define “what foreign policy the new Russian Federation should pursue, and even what kind of state Russia should be”. The fundamental challenges for Russian foreign policy and even inner policy after the collapse of the Communist system were related to “the limits of sovereignty, the meaning of the right of peoples to self-determination, the legality of international intervention, the function and powers of the United Nations, and the role of NATO in the post-Cold War world”. All of these matters and challenges which were also of great importance to Moscow were closely linked to the events in Yugoslavia.
The author divides the attitudes of the Russian foreign policy to the Yugoslavian conflict into two different periods and convincingly argues that the change of Russian approaches towards Yugoslavia were connected with the changes of wider foreign policy and effort of Kremlin to play in world events more assertive role. This major shift took place in 1993, in times when Andrei Kozyrev was responsible for Russian foreign affairs. Since 1993 the Russian attitudes towards the Yugoslavian war were aimed to “demonstrate Russia’s great status and preserve its perceived interests in the Balkans”. The last shift of the Russian policy towards Yugoslavia came, according to Headley, with Putin whose entirely pragmatic approach led to entering into partnership with the United States in the “war against terror” after 11th September 2001.
The monograph is structured in principal chronologically. The first, essentially introductory, part of the book presents in three chapters a summary of the Soviet (Russian) policy in the Balkans in historical perspective, the analysis of Russian wider foreign policy after 1991 and the various rival outlooks of Russian political streams towards the Balkans. The second part deals in six chapters with the Russian foreign policy towards the Yugoslavian conflict until Dayton negotiations. The author particularly analyzes the Russian withdrawal from pro-Western attitude led by liberal internationalists; this change was manifested by the Russian effort to prevent NATO military action which “was part of the wider resistance to NATO expansion”. Despite the Russian objection NATO in 1995 waged a major air attack against the Bosnian Serbs followed by the Dayton negotiations. The third part analyzes in four chapters the Russian attitudes towards the Balkans after Dayton; Headley argues that Russian policy remained principally unchanged even after Evgenii Primakov replaced Kozyrev as foreign minister. The author argues that Primakov, as his predecessor, viewed Serbia (Yugoslavia) “as a potential ally for Russian in the Balkans”. One of the most important matters dealt in this part is the Kosovo crises.
Headley monograph is based on the large amount of resources in Russian and English languages such as the collection of documents, documentaries (for example the reports of BBC etc.) and very worth interviews with some important participants of Russian foreign policy, commentators (journalists) and scholars; as well as his secondary sources in English and Russian language testify that his monograph is well researched. On the other side despite the book analyzes primarily the Russian attitudes towards the Balkans I believe the author should also take into account the sources coming from the former Yugoslavia which could enrich the whole picture. The hardback publication of the book which does not lack well elaborated index witnesses an excellent work not only of the author but also the publishing house HURST Publishers Ltd.
Stanislav Tumis
James Headley, a lecturer in political studies at the University of Otago, New Zealand, wrote in many respects original study (monograph) because this important and topical theme was until now neglected by scholars. The events in former Yugoslavia were according to Headley from many reasons “the subject of intense debate within Russia”. First of all the conflict in Yugoslavia served as a “horror mirror”, as a deterrent example how the dissolution of the Soviet Union should not be directed. Yet the author argues that on the other side within the Soviet Union were influential people (nationalists) who “admired the Serbian leadership and the Bosnian and Krajina Serb leaders for seeking to maintain a state for Serbs, a Greater Serbia” and were inspired by centralists in Belgrade who maintained a unitary state. In this sense, as Headley documents, the Yugoslavian conflict became also the matter of struggle among the various political streams in Russia. Significantly the war in Yugoslavia helped the Russian politics after the end of the Cold war to define “what foreign policy the new Russian Federation should pursue, and even what kind of state Russia should be”. The fundamental challenges for Russian foreign policy and even inner policy after the collapse of the Communist system were related to “the limits of sovereignty, the meaning of the right of peoples to self-determination, the legality of international intervention, the function and powers of the United Nations, and the role of NATO in the post-Cold War world”. All of these matters and challenges which were also of great importance to Moscow were closely linked to the events in Yugoslavia.
The author divides the attitudes of the Russian foreign policy to the Yugoslavian conflict into two different periods and convincingly argues that the change of Russian approaches towards Yugoslavia were connected with the changes of wider foreign policy and effort of Kremlin to play in world events more assertive role. This major shift took place in 1993, in times when Andrei Kozyrev was responsible for Russian foreign affairs. Since 1993 the Russian attitudes towards the Yugoslavian war were aimed to “demonstrate Russia’s great status and preserve its perceived interests in the Balkans”. The last shift of the Russian policy towards Yugoslavia came, according to Headley, with Putin whose entirely pragmatic approach led to entering into partnership with the United States in the “war against terror” after 11th September 2001.
The monograph is structured in principal chronologically. The first, essentially introductory, part of the book presents in three chapters a summary of the Soviet (Russian) policy in the Balkans in historical perspective, the analysis of Russian wider foreign policy after 1991 and the various rival outlooks of Russian political streams towards the Balkans. The second part deals in six chapters with the Russian foreign policy towards the Yugoslavian conflict until Dayton negotiations. The author particularly analyzes the Russian withdrawal from pro-Western attitude led by liberal internationalists; this change was manifested by the Russian effort to prevent NATO military action which “was part of the wider resistance to NATO expansion”. Despite the Russian objection NATO in 1995 waged a major air attack against the Bosnian Serbs followed by the Dayton negotiations. The third part analyzes in four chapters the Russian attitudes towards the Balkans after Dayton; Headley argues that Russian policy remained principally unchanged even after Evgenii Primakov replaced Kozyrev as foreign minister. The author argues that Primakov, as his predecessor, viewed Serbia (Yugoslavia) “as a potential ally for Russian in the Balkans”. One of the most important matters dealt in this part is the Kosovo crises.
Headley monograph is based on the large amount of resources in Russian and English languages such as the collection of documents, documentaries (for example the reports of BBC etc.) and very worth interviews with some important participants of Russian foreign policy, commentators (journalists) and scholars; as well as his secondary sources in English and Russian language testify that his monograph is well researched. On the other side despite the book analyzes primarily the Russian attitudes towards the Balkans I believe the author should also take into account the sources coming from the former Yugoslavia which could enrich the whole picture. The hardback publication of the book which does not lack well elaborated index witnesses an excellent work not only of the author but also the publishing house HURST Publishers Ltd.
Stanislav Tumis
Last modified: Thursday, 27 September 2012, 2:44 PM